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Abstract: Can we negotiate our way out of disagreements? When the chances of persuading the counterpart are
low, it might be possible to shift a persuasion to a negotiation dialogue. But what are the conditions for that
shift? I will argue that, at least, the following conditions must hold: the disagreement must be practical rather
than theoretical; and the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice. When that happens, disagreements can be
negotiated, and such negotiation will be a type of practical argumentation.
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1. Introduction
When people encounter a disagreement, they can do many things to overcome it. Among
other strategies, they can argue to persuade the counterpart, call an arbitrator or mediator, toss
a coin, or look for a compromise. In the last case they are using negotiation as a way out of
their disagreement. Consider the following example:
Example 1: Dinner out
Jack and Leyla want to go to a restaurant but disagree on whether to pick “The
Rose Garden” or “Chez Martin”. To overcome the disagreement, they can:
1.A Argue that one of the restaurants is a better choice than the other (because of
food quality, price, location, etc).
1.B Offer a compromise, such as: “We’ll go to ‘Chez Martin’ this time, and to
‘The Rose Garden’ next time” or “I will invite you if we go to ‘The Rose
Garden’”.
In the example the parties can choose between providing persuasive reasons (1.A) or
negotiating (1.B). In the first case they are using a persuasion dialogue, in the second case a
negotiation dialogue (Walton & Krabbe, 1995). They can also do both: start with 1.A and
then shift the dialogue to 1.B; or use a mixed dialogue type.
Negotiation has usually been conceived as type of dialogue where the parties bargain
their interests to get the best for themselves (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Ihnen Jory, 2016;
Walton, 1998; Wells & Reed, 2006). Under that conception, negotiation has to do with a
difference of interests, rather than a difference of opinion. Therefore, the parties do not aim at
arriving at a true answer but at settling the disagreement in the best way possible for them.
However, as some authors claim (Provis, 2004; Sycara, 1990; van Laar & Krabbe,
2018), negotiation and persuasion are deeply intertwined. So along with negotiations that are
pure bargaining, negotiation can also be used to overcome differences of opinion. In order to
do that the parties must change the dialogue type from persuasion to negotiation in what has
been called the shift to negotiation (Van Laar & Krabbe, 2018).
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In this paper I will further develop and specify Van Laar and Krabbe´s idea that
negotiations can be used to overcome1 differences of opinion through the shift to negotiation.
Specifically, I will use the more generic term “disagreement” to ask two questions: First,
what kind of disagreements can be negotiated? Second, how does negotiation as a
disagreement management tool works, and how is it different from persuasion?
To answer the first question, I will argue that disagreements can be shifted to
negotiation given two conditions: (a) the disagreement must be practical rather than
theoretical, and (b) the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice in order to arrive at a
compromise; more specifically, they must be willing to sacrifice their epistemic goal in favor
of their social goal (Jacobs, 2003).
Then, I will specify how negotiation works in this context and what is its relation to
persuasion. I will claim that negotiation of disagreements is a type of practical
argumentation. As such, it is a type of argumentation that considers, as a relevant
circumstance, the opinion of the counterpart. In such sense, negotiation as practical
argumentation can be considered second-order persuasion.
The plan of the paper is the following: In section 2, I will distinguish two types of
negotiation, the bargaining type and the disagreement management type; in section 3, I will
specify the first requisite for the shift to negotiation, which is that the disagreement must be
practical rather than theoretical; and, in section 4, I will specify the second requisite of the
shift to negotiation, that is, that the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice. In section 4, I
will argue that negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. In the conclusion I will
present some final remarks and questions for future research.
2. What is a negotiation?
There’s two ways to look at negotiation: as bargaining of interests or as a disagreement
management tool.
2.1 The bargaining type
When seen as bargaining, to negotiate is to get the best possible deal at a given situation.
Along this line Walton characterizes negotiation as “a form of interest-based bargaining
where the goal is to ‘get the best deal.’” (1989, p. 175, 1990, p. 412). Negotiation has also
been defined “a means to distribute limited resources between competing agents. Negotiation
can be used to determine the distribution of those resources between the conflicting parties”
(Wells & Reed, 2006). Accordingly, negotiation is a kind of trade-off of interests, where the
parties don’t start from a disagreement situation but, rather, from a conflict of interests
(Walton & Krabbe, 1995).
Under the bargaining view, in a negotiation the truth of the matter is almost irrelevant.
More than committed to the truth, the parties are committed to their interests. This contrasts
with persuasion and inquiry dialogues, where the parties try to prove that some proposition is
true or false (Walton, 1998). Given the bargaining idea, then, the distinction between
persuasion and negotiation dialogue is quite clear: in a persuasion dialogue the parties
provide arguments to convince the counterpart that certain statement is true or false; while in
a negotiation the parties aim for the fulfillment of their own interests.
2.2. Disagreement management type
I prefer to use the term “to overcome” instead of “to resolve” to keep resolution as the outcome of a
persuasion, rather negotiation. This is coherent with the pragma-dialectic use of the term, where resolution
implies “that the argumentative discourse has resulted in agreement between the parties involved on whether or
not the standpoint at issue is acceptable” (van Eemeren et al. 2014, p. 528).
1
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Along with the bargaining view, some authors claim that negotiation can be used to
overcome differences of opinion (Van Laar & Krabbe, 2018). I will call this type of
negotiation practical disagreement case. When used as such, negotiation is a disagreement
management tool, that is, a way to find a rational solution to the problem posed by the
disagreement.
In the practical disagreement case, the parties face not only a clash of interest, but
also a practical disagreement or disagreement regarding a policy or course of action (more on
this on the following section). As in a persuasion dialogue, in this type of negotiation the
beliefs of the parties are not fixed, but may change as a dynamic system (Sycara, 1990).
Therefore, the beliefs of the parties and their meta-beliefs (beliefs about their counterpart’s
beliefs) are at the center of the negotiation. What the parties aim for, then, is not only to get
the best possible deal but to change the counterpart’s attitude towards certain standpoint.
Therefore, in this type of negotiation persuasion is central and not secondary, and the
boundaries between negotiation and persuasion tend to fade (Provis, 2004). This process will
be better described in section 5 of this paper.
The shift to negotiation is a way in which negotiation can be used as a disagreement
management tool. But in order to do that two requisites need to be met: the disagreement
must be practical, and the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice or compromise. I will
explain these requisites in the following sections.
3. First requisite: practical disagreement

3.1 What is a practical disagreement about?
Even assuming that negotiation is a disagreement management tool, it is clear enough that not
every type of disagreement can be shifted from persuasion to negotiation. Consider the
following cases:
Example 2: Global Warming
2.A Laura and Patrick are lawmakers. They disagree over on whether global
warming is being caused by human activity.
2.B Laura and Patrick are lawmakers. They disagree over approving or rejecting
a policy that will tax carbon in order to fight global warming.
In case 2.A, if the parties want to overcome the disagreement, they must present persuasive
reasons: there’s no amount of money that Laura can offer to Patrick to change his mind. But
in case 2.B, besides presenting persuasive reasons the parties can negotiate. For instance,
Laura could say: “If you approve this bill, I will approve next week’s bill on tax cut”.
Why can negotiation be performed in 2.B but not in 2.A? A first approach would be the
following: 2.A is a disagreement over a descriptive statement while 2.A is a disagreement
over an evaluative disagreement. Therefore, disagreement over descriptive statements are
non-negotiable, while disagreements over evaluative statements are negotiable.
This would be coherent with Sproule (1980) who distinguishes three types of statements:
facts, interpretations and evaluations. So, while 2.A is an interpretation (because it has to do
with the causes of a state of affairs), 2.B is an evaluation because the parties evaluate that
certain action or policy is “good” or “bad”.
But this is not fine-grained enough. It appears that some evaluations can be negotiated while
other cannot. Consider the following example:
3

Example 3: Vacation destination
3.A Ana and Claudia disagree on whether Brazil or New Zealand is a better
vacation destination.
3.B Ana and Claudia are going on vacation together, but they disagree about
going to Brazil or New Zealand.
In both these cases the parties are making an evaluation: they disagree about the goodness of
Brazil or New Zealand as a vacation destination. Also, in both cases the parties could try to
persuade each other by providing persuasive reasons. In fact, the reasons could be exactly the
same. In 3.A and 3.B Ana could say that Brazil is cheaper and has better weather, while
Claudia could argue that New Zealand is safer and has better infrastructure.
But only in 3.B the parties can negotiate their way out of the disagreement. Ana could
say something like: “look, I know you prefer New Zealend but for this year let’s go to Brazil.
I promise that we will go to New Zealand next year.” Or something like “I will pay you the
airplane ticket if we go to Brazil.” On the other hand, negotiation wouldn’t be possible in
3.A. Even if Ana would offer 100 billion dollars to Claudia to change her mind, she shouldn’t
be able to do it unless Ana could provide persuasive reasons. So, there must be a difference
between 3.A. and 3.B. Calling both of them “evaluations” is not enough to distinguish
practical from theoretical disagreements.
Steinberg & Freeley (1986) consider three types of statements: about fact, value and
policy. So, while 3.A would be an example of a disagreement over a value, 3.B would be an
example of a disagreement over a policy. A value proposition evaluates the goodness of a
state of affairs, while a policy tries to answer the question “what should we do about it?”.
Therefore, the parties can negotiate policies, not evaluations.
I will call disagreements about facts or value theoretical disagreements, and
disagreements about policies practical disagreements. But why practical disagreements can
be shifted to negotiation while theoretical ones cannot? What is it about policy propositions
that makes them different to facts and value propositions?
It could be that the type of commitment is different. If disagreement is a clash of
commitments2, then in cases like 2.A or 3.A the parties are committed to defending the truth
of a statement, in other words, they are asking: “is P true?”; while in cases like 2.B or 3.B
they are committed to defending the desirability of a statement, in other words, they ask:
“should we do P?”. In the same sense, Lumer has argued that practical arguments relate to the
“desirability of states of affair” (2005, p. 232).
If we consider that negotiation is a type of trade, then it is clearer why only practical
disagreements can be traded: We can trade our desires, not our beliefs.
This is commonsensical. We usually trade our desires. If I have a strong desire to eat
chocolate cake, it seems possible to trade such a desire. For example, if my partner wants me
to avoid eating chocolate cake, she could offer me to do the dishes if I restrain myself. Of
course, my partner could also use persuasive reasons instead, like: “do you remember that
you wanted to lose wight? Do you know how many calories that cake has?”
On the other hand, beliefs can´t be traded. The only way in which people can change her
counterpart’s theoretical commitments is through persuasion. We don’t expect that people’s
beliefs could be traded. That’s why the following joke by the Marx brothers is funny: “these
are my principles, if you don’t like them, I have others.”
2

The fact that the disagreement is about commitments implies a clash regarding only propositions that the
parties publicly are committed to. It refers to the concept of commitment as Walton and Krabbe (1995) use it,
which derives from Hamblin (1970). It means that the parties clash regarding propositions that they are
committed to defend, which does not always coincide with what they believe.
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3.2 The nature of desires
The fact that a proposition containing desires can be argued persuasively or negotiated
implies upholding certain view on desires: that desires are “attitudes towards propositions” or
“have propositional content” (Schroeder, 2017, p. 7). In other words, we desire some state of
affairs expressed in a proposition. If desires wouldn’t have propositional content it would be
impossible to use persuasion dialogue to change them, since persuasion is always about the
truth of a proposition (Walton, 1998)
Therefore, the difference between practical and theoretical disagreement is the following:
theoretical disagreements are disagreements regarding a belief on certain state of affairs P,
while practical disagreements are disagreements regarding the desirability of certain state of
affairs P.
Thanks to this distinction we could point out the difference between 3.A and 3.B. In the
first case the parties merely state that something is better than something else. Therefore, they
are referring to the goodness of certain state of affairs, but they are not desiring anything
regarding that state of affairs3.
3.3 Requisites of practical disagreement
However, not every desire would lead the parties to a practical disagreement. Besides the
parties having desires, in order to disagree practically it is necessary that those desires clash
with each other. For example, if when ordering at a restaurant, John desires chocolate cake
and Jane desires ice cream, it is perfectly possible that they both satisfy their desires without
having to disagree. A disagreement would occur only if the desire of one party is
incompatible to the desire of the other party.
But even clashing desires might not lead to practical disagreement if the parties have
no agency over the desired state of affairs. For example: Juan wants Real Madrid to win at
the Champion League’s final, and Bob wants Liverpool to win at it. They sit at a bar and
discuss the upcoming game, expressing their desires. In this case, Juan’s desire is not
compatible with Bob’s desire and vice-versa. However, we wouldn’t say that this is a
practical disagreement. There is something lacking; namely, there´s nothing that Juan or Bob
can do to make their team win: they don’t have agency over that particular state of affairs.
Therefore, this is not a practical disagreement, not even a theoretical one. The parties just past
each other: Juan desires something and Bob desires something else.
But even having a clash of desires and agency over the desired state of affairs, the
parties might still not be facing a practical disagreement if they are not willing or forced to
act upon their desire. In that case we are not, yet, in a practical disagreement but in a
theoretical one. For example, 3.B would be different if the parties, instead of saying: “we
should go to Brazil” or “we should go to New Zealand” would say “It would be good to go to
Brazil with you”. In that case the parties are expressing their clashing desires, and have
agency over it (imagine that they have the time and money to do such a trip) but if they
haven’t decided to act upon it they are not in a practical disagreement situation.
In practical disagreements the parties decide to act upon their desired state of affairs,
voluntarily or forced to do it. In a forced option, as William James (1960) describe it, the
parties must do something. For example, in 2.B the parties must vote over the new bill, they
can’t just decide to do nothing about it (staying at home the day of the voting is a way of
doing something about it by omission).
3

This does not imply that evaluations are necessarily referred to states of affairs external to the agent making
the evaluation. That is a big discussion in meta-ethics that is out of the scope of the present paper. So, let’s just
say: in an evaluation the parties do not desire the state of affairs but merely describe it as good or bad, while in a
policy proposition the parties desire certain state of affairs.
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In consequence, practical disagreements would occur only if: (1) two or more parties
have desires over a state of affairs; (2) those desires are clashing with each other; (3) the
parties have agency over the desired state of affairs; and, (4) the parties are willing or forced
to act upon the desired state of affairs. If (1) or (2) are not met, the parties might be in a
dialogue, but not in a disagreement. If (3) or (4) are not met the parties will be in a theoretical
rather than in practical disagreement.
Therefore, a definition of practical disagreement would be the following: a clash of
commitments between two or more parties regarding a desire over certain state of affairs,
where the parties have agency over the state of affairs and are willing or forced to act upon
it.
3.4. Types of practical disagreement
Considering the four requisites just given, the field of practical disagreements can be better
mapped. There are two types of disagreements that can be overcome by negotiation:
(1) A and B hold clashing desires over the allocation of certain scarce goods.
(2) And B hold clashing desires over a policy.
Case (1) is very close to the “bargaining type” of negotiation described by Walton (1998) or
Wells and Reed (2006). For example, if party A wants to buy a car from party B, or if two
companies are negotiating a construction contract, we are in presence of this kind of
negotiation. In this kind of disagreement, the parties are committed to their own interests, and
the truth of the matter (if there is such a thing) is mostly irrelevant. Persuasion could still play
a role on this kind of disagreement, but it is certainly minor, and the parties could
successfully negotiate without trying to persuade at all 4. In most cases we shouldn’t expect
that this kind of disagreement can be shifted from or to a persuasion dialogue.
Case (2) refers to the “policy statement” described before. The Merrian-Webster
dictionary defines policy as: “a definite course or method of action selected from among
alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future
decisions.” In this case the parties try to answer the normative question: “what should we
do?” The dictionary considers two cases: a “course of action” or a “method of action.”.
In a “course of action,” the parties are committed to a joint action but disagree over
the best way to do it. For example, two doctors performing surgery may disagree over the
best way to proceed, a couple may disagree over their next vacation destination or the
managers of a company may disagree about firing an employee.
The “method of action” implies deciding certain rule for guiding future decisions. In a
practical disagreement the parties disagree over whether or not imposing that rule. Anyhow, a
rule could be private (“no TV after 7 PM”) or public (“we will tax carbon emissions by
50%”).
In a policy proposition there is an intended goal and some means to arrive at that goal.
The parties might disagree over the intended goal or about the means to arrive at it. So, for
example, two doctors performing a surgery have the same goal: to save the patient. But they
might disagree about the best way to do it. On the other hand, two politicians might have
totally different goals; one of them wants to raise taxes, while the other wants to diminish
them.

So, for instance, if I’m trying to sell my car I can use persuasive arguments such as: “look, the car is in very
good shape, I’ve never had a mechanical problem”; or I can just go to the negotiation phase: “this is the price.”
4
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When Van Laar and Krabbe (2018) analyze the shift to negotiation they are thinking in
case (2). Therefore, from now on I will reserve the term “practical disagreement” for those
cases.
4. Second requisite: Willingness to trade
a. To trade or not to trade
The fact that a disagreement is practical does not necessarily imply that it makes sense to
make a shift to negotiation. Consider the following case:
Example 4.A: Emergency room
Philip and Rose are doctors who are performing a very complicated surgery
when the patient starts having complications. Then the following dialogue
ensues:
(1) Philip: we are losing him! We should give him 100 millimeters of drug A.
(2) Rose: I disagree! Drug B would work better.
In this case we wouldn’t consider reasonable a shift to negotiation. For example, if Phillip
says: “look, if we give him drug X I will buy you lunch” or “let’s give him half dose of both
drugs” we would consider that move improper. But what makes it odd to shift the dialogue to
negotiation in this case? Compare that case with the following:
Example 4.B: Movie night
Susan and Emily are going to the movies. However, they disagree on which movie
to watch. After giving persuasive arguments to support their choice, they shift the
dialogue to a negotiation:
(1) Susan: Look, I really don’t want to watch movie A. Let’s do something, I will
invite you to some drinks afterwards if we watch movie B.
(2) Emily: Ok, that’s an offer I can`t refuse.
In this case, the shift to negotiation seems completely adequate. Then, what is the difference
between 4.A and 4.B? Let’s say, first, what they have in common: in both cases there is a
practical disagreement of the joint action type described before. Therefore, in both cases the
parties hold clashing commitment regarding their desires over the best course of action.
The difference seems to be in one element: the importance of the truth of the matter. I
agree with Lumer (2005, p. 233) in considering that practical disagreements have an
epistemic value and, therefore, can be reconstructed in terms of truth and knowledge. Natural
language seems to back this position. When facing a practical disagreement people will
usually say things like: “you don’t know what you are doing” or “it’s not true that this is the
best option”5.
Cases 4.A could be reconstructed in these terms. On case 4.A. there is a moral
imperative: to save the life of the patient. Taking the best course of action to save the life of
Rather than “theoretical knowledge” what the parties have is “practical knowledge”. Which has been defined
as “the knowledge that is inherent in the experience of bringing something to fruition. The reality it ‘knows’ is
available by and through the agent's ‘doing’ as it pertains to the active pursuit of that value or project.” (Wilks
Keefer, 1996, p. 40)
5
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the patient (whether that’s drug A, drug B, or something else) seems to be the correct answer.
Therefore, it would be appropriate for one of the parties to say: “I know that drug A will save
his life, I read a paper about it” or “it is true that drug A will save his life.”
Case 4.B can also be reconstrued in these terms. If Susan prefers move A and Emily
prefers movie B, then there must be a correct true course of action where the overall likeness
is maximized, and the overall dislike is minimized. For instance, it might be that, other
conditions being equal, the dislike of Susan for movie B is bigger than the dislike of Emily
for movie A. Therefore, movie A should be the best option and Susan could say: I know that
you will love movie A.
So, the difference between cases 4.A and 4.B seems to be the following: in both cases the
truth of the matter is relevant, but in case 4.A, the truth of the matter is way more important:
the life of a patient is at stake. So, while in case 4.A the parties should try to overcome the
issue by persuasive means, in case 4.B a negotiation is a reasonable solution. The shift to
negotiation must be evaluated by the parties considering, especially, their social and
epistemic goal.
4.2 Two goals of argumentation
Jacobs (2003) considers that argumentation serves two main functions: a cognitive or
epistemic function and a social function. The cognitive or epistemic function implies an
individual effort for belief management. Therefore, it has to do with arriving as close as
possible to the truth of the matter. If we define argumentation solely by that function, we
should say that argumentation is “a social quest for true belief and error avoidance”
(Goldman, 1994, p. 28). But that’s not the only function of argumentation. The social
function implies a quest for disagreement management. It has to do with arriving at an
agreement, even if that implies sacrificing, to some extent, the epistemic goal.
When faced with practical disagreements the parties need to consider what they value
the most. If they value their epistemic goal, then negotiation is not advised: they should keep
providing persuasive arguments, aiming for the best outcome. But if they value the social
goal more, they might be willing to make a sacrifice: give up their epistemic goal to secure
the social goal. In other words, the parties need to choose between truth and agreement. If
they pick truth, they will try to keep persuading each other or look for other argumentative or
non-argumentative settlement methods6. If they pick agreement, they will give up part of their
epistemic goal (therefore, part of their desires) to look for an agreement. Of course, the value
that the parties give to each goal will vary in every case, but in some situations, like the
examples presented before, we can expect that most people will react in a predictable way.
Sometimes, things are complicated. When discussing policy propositions some parties
will give more value to their cognitive goal, while other will settle for a negotiation. We can
call the first group ideologic (“these are my principles, I will not change my position”), and
the second group pragmatic (“any agreement is better than nothing at all”). Consider the
following example (van Laar & Krabbe, 2018):
Example 5: Greenhouse emissions
Party A and Party B disagree about the level of renewable energy that should be
used by 2020. Party A proposes a 18% and party B a 14%. After trying to
persuade each other providing several reasons they arrive at a stalemate: no
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Like arbitration, mediation, trial, mere luck or violence.
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party has been able to persuade the other. Therefore, they decide to split the
difference at 16%7.
In this case the parties have arrived at a stalemate. Insisting on a persuasion dialogue seems a
bad idea because nobody seems to be persuading the counterpart, and even if they do,
persuasion might have high costs and dangers (Paglieri & Castelfranchi, 2010). Since both
the parties are pragmatic enough, a negotiation is successful. However, we need only one
ideologic party to make the negotiation fail.
In the end, what the parties put on the scales are their desires on one side, and the
chances of persuading, costs and dangers of persuasive argumentation on the other. More
pragmatic parties will have a scale that leans towards agreement (social goal) and will need a
very strong case to lean towards truth (like example 4.A). Ideologic parties have a scale that
leans towards truth, so choosing agreement will only happen if the costs or dangers of
arguing are too high, or the chances of persuading too low.
So far, I hope to have shown that negotiation is a sound way for resolving disagreements,
as long those disagreements are practical, and the parties are willing to make a sacrifice. But
how does negotiation of this kind works? I will answer this question in the following section.
4

Negotiation as practical argumentation

I claim that negotiation as a disagreement management tool is a type of practical
argumentation. To understand this, it is necessary first to clarify what is practical reasoning
and what is its difference with practical argumentation. Then, I will establish in which sense
negotiation is a type of practical argumentation. Finally, I will distinguish persuasion from
negotiation.
b. Practical reasoning and practical argumentation
Practical reasoning has been defined as:
“a goal-driven, knowledge-based, action- guiding species of reasoning that
coordinates goals with possible alternative courses of action that are means to
carry out these goals, in relation to an agent’s given situation as he/she/it sees it,
and concludes in a proposition that recommends a prudent course of action”
(Walton, 1997, p. 160).
To understand Walton’s definition we need to bear in mind that he considers “reasoning” to
be: “a sequence of steps from some point (premises) to other points (conclusions)” (1990, p.
404). Therefore, practical reasoning is a special kind of reasoning where someone begins
with a given situation and try to move towards certain goals.
Thagard provides a simple model for practical reasoning:
“My goals are G1... Gn.
The possible actions are A1 ... Am.
Aj is the best means of accomplishing the goals.
Therefore, I should do Aj” (1984, p. 26).
7

I recognize two types of negotiation: splitting type and additional offer type. This example is a splitting type,
and it can be performed as long as the object of disagreement allows splitting. That is not always the case. In
example 3.B, for instance, the parties can’t watch half movie, but they can still offer something else. In the
additional offer type, the parties offer something else, which can be related or not to the original disagreement,
as in example 3.B.
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Under this conception, practical reasoning seems to be a kind of individual and cognitive
activity. For example, if I’m playing chess I can reason as follows:
My goal at move 8 is to check the black king.
The possible actions to check the king are moving the rook or the knight.
Moving the knight is the best way of accomplishing my goal, because P and Q.
Therefore, I should move the knight.
This is practical reasoning but not, yet, practical argumentation. I´m not providing any
argument why it’s a good idea to move the knight, I’m just thinking about it. Practical
argumentation only appears when I need to argue with someone else over my practical
reasoning.
According to Walton an argument is defined as “a social and verbal means of trying to
resolve, or at least contend with a conflict or difference that has arisen between two parties
engaged in a dialogue” (1990, p. 411). Van Eemeren and Grootendorst consider that
“argumentation” is adduced in reaction to, or in anticipation of, a difference of opinion, and
serves a role in the regulation of disagreement” (2004, p. 53). Therefore, practical reasoning
will only turn into practical argumentation when a disagreement arises, and the parties need
to externalize their reasoning.8
Considering the above picture, practical argumentation and negotiation seem different
dialogue types. It is one thing to use practical reasons to convince the counterpart of the
convenience of a policy, and another thing to offer a pragmatic compromise. But is it so? If
we consider argumentation to be a dynamic process, then persuasion and negotiation have
very little difference.
c. Negotiation as practical argumentation
When we argue for a practical goal we can use all sorts of arguments and argumentation
schemes, even more than in the theoretical case (Craig, 1996). Some arguments refer to the
object of disagreement, they try to prove that certain course of action is the best for achieving
certain goal or that certain goal is desirable, without considering the beliefs of the
counterpart. But other arguments take the counterpart’s beliefs, the dialogical situation and
the disagreement space in consideration, and argue considering what is feasible given these
circumstances. When this happens the practical argumentation process can move from a
persuasion to a negotiation dialogue.
We can look at this problem from the standpoint of desires. As stated in section 2,
practical disagreements refer to a clash of desires. The clash could be about the goal of the
parties, or about the means to arrive at that goal. Therefore, two parties can disagree about
whether or not to go to Paris, or about going by train or plane. In any case, once they have
shared their desires (or in anticipation of its sharing), they might realize that persuasion is not
possible or too costly. Therefore, they might choose to negotiate.
But what happens to their original desire during the negotiation phase? It is still there,
but it has been affected by another desire. In the literature of desires this phenomenon has
been labeled as second-order desires (Frankfurt, 1998). Second-order desires are desires
about first order desires, which are the things that we desire in first place. Accordingly, if
Ana desires to go to Brazil and Claudia to New Zealand, that is their first-order desire. But,
since they realize that they disagree, Ana might have a second-order desire that overrules the
8

This does not imply that argumentation without disagreement cannot occur, as some authors have pointed out
(Blair, 2012; Doury, 2012; Micheli, 2012).
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first and allow the parties to agree on something. For instance, it could be that Ana desires
strongly to go on vacation with Claudia, so this higher-order desire, along with the realization
that she will not persuade her counterpart, allows her to be open for a negotiation9. In a
negotiation the first order desire will, typically, refer to the epistemic goal, while the secondorder desire will refer to the social goal. In other words: one of the parties desires P to be the
case, but also desires an agreement. The desire for an agreement might overrule the desire for
P, modifying P to P.’
This dynamic process will affect the parties at the level of their reasons. Then, they will have
prior reasons (before knowing the counterpart’s opinion) and posterior reasons that they have
adjusted considering the social situation10.
Negotiation, then, is a type of practical argumentation were the parties adjust their goals or
their means-goal relationship, in accordance with the social situation (or the social goal, in
Jacobs’s terms). Lewinski’s (2017) scheme of practical argumentation will we useful to
clarify the dynamics of the process.
Figure 1
The scheme of practical argumentation (Lewiński, 2017, p. 90)

In example 3.A “Emergency room” both parties desire to save the patient’s life. Therefore, it is hard to find a
higher order desire capable of overruling the first one.
10
In this sense, the situation is analogous to the concept of higher-order evidence, which is evidence about the
first order evidence (Kelly, 2010).
9
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In this scheme the parties have certain goals (G) that arise from their values (V). Analyzing
the circumstances (C) they propose a course of action (M) that may take the situation from C
to G. This course of action can have three levels: M is the best, satisfactory, or good enough.
This scheme is static, but once it becomes dynamic it can be used to understand negotiation.
Let’s take example 5, “greenhouse emissions”, to clarify this. In the example, there are two
different moments, t0 and t1. The first is the persuasion dialogue phase, the second is the
negotiation phase.
At t0 Party A proposes that 18% of energy should be produced by renewable sources. At this
stage, then, their scheme could be reconstructed as:
V: We are committed to the avoidance of global warming.
G: We want to reduce the amount of C02 emitted by our country.
C: Global warming is happening, our country has signed the Paris agreement, we
are in a good economic position, technologies allow energy transition, etc.
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M-G: We need to produce as much energy as possible by renewable sources. An
18% of renewable sources is the best course of action.
Conclusion: We should produce 18% of our energy by renewable sources.
Party B also produces an analogous scheme, that argues that a 14% of renewable energy is all
that the country can afford. The difference arises from the fact that, probably, party B has
different values (for instance, they say: we are committed to provide cheap energy for the
people).
But when they both share their arguments something changes. Both parties realize that
they are not going to persuade their counterpart, and that, therefore, their proposal is not
feasible. Accordingly, at t1, party A adds a new circumstance in the circumstances box:
C: party B is not convinced by our proposal at t0.
This new circumstance affects the whole process. Now, they have a higher-order desire (to
arrive at an agreement) affecting their first-order desire. Therefore, they need to change
something. For social, more than epistemic reasons, they settle and change the M-G box from
“best” to “satisfactory”, changing the number11:
M-G: We need to produce as much energy as possible by renewable sources. A 16%
of renewable sources is good enough.
Party B also modifies their scheme in a similar way. Therefore, they both agree on a solution.
The shift to negotiation could be, then, be seen as a change in the dialogue type. But we could
also think of it as a dynamic and collaborative persuasion dialogue: at t0, party A has
persuaded party B that 16% is a good figure for both of them. The process can, therefore, be
called meta-persuasion.
d. Negotiation and persuasion
What is exactly the relationship between persuasion and negotiation? I’ve claimed that the
distinction is blurry, at least for the disagreement management type but, how exactly? Can we
still say that there’s one thing called persuasion and another argumentation?
For Van Laar and Krabbe (2018) in a negotiation process there is a number of secondorder disagreements that might be resolved trough persuasion. For example, a second-order
disagreement has to do with the method for dealing with the irresolvable first order issue
when it appears. If the parties agree on a compromise, it is a kind of second-order resolution
that facilitates dealing with the first-order issue.
This position seems correct in considering that in a negotiation there are second-order
disagreements, but it’s a little bit too artificial. What parties facing a practical disagreement
usually do is aim for the best option, providing reasons why their option should be preferred.
When they find that the disagreement in unresolvable or that persuasive argumentation is too
costly or dangerous, they present a solution that is good enough, providing persuasive reasons
for it. If the disagreement is still unresolvable, they might present a necessary solution12. If
after that, there is still no agreement, they might change their initial position and start all over
again.13
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A bigger change would imply changing their goal. However probably in this case they are ideologic regarding
their goal.
12
The categories of best, good enough and necessary are taken from Lewiński (2017).
13
Remember that many practical disagreements are forced options, so suspending judgement is not an option.
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Ultimately, then, negotiation as practical argumentation is a sort of meta- persuasion.
So, what is the difference between persuasion and negotiation dialogue regarding practical
disagreements?
In a persuasion dialogue, the parties take only into consideration only first-order reasons.
That is, reasons why P is a good policy, without considering or anticipating the opinion of the
counterpart. In a negotiation dialogue, the parties do take into account the opinion of the
counterpart, plus the costs and dangers of argumentation. Therefore, their persuasive
argument aims not at the best option, but at an option that is at least good enough. They are
trading truth for agreement.
5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to show that the shift to negotiation is a useful way for overcoming
disagreements. To do that I wanted to show, first, the requisites of the shift to negotiation to,
then, show that the disagreement management type of negotiation is a form of practical
argumentation.
The novelty of the paper was to flesh out the circumstances in which that shift might
occur, and the dynamics that it could take. My ultimate goal is to understand the dynamics of
disagreements, and how disagreements can be overcome by rational means. In such sense,
exploring the possibilities of negotiation can present it under a new light, that allows us to
think of it as a type of argumentation that is advantageous in practical settings.
Many questions remain unanswered, however. Among them are the normative
requirements of this type of negotiation. When can we say that the parties have acted
irrationally? If this type of negotiation is just a type of practical argumentation, what is
fallacious for them? Also, a deeper approach to negotiation as a disagreement management
tool would require the reconstruction of actual negotiation dialogues, to see how they fit with
this model. Finally, it would be interesting to understand the difference between negotiation
as practical argumentation and deliberation.
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